this rational idea is not arbitrary or accidental, but is motivated by a consideration of its role in cffecting a transition from the common understanding of morais to practical philosophy proper. The dialectical concept of the highest good is employed by Kant in the Foundations when he wants to show why the innocence of ordinary reason needs to be tempered with philosophy. In a rare and barely disguised use of sarcasm Kant actually gives preference to the common understanding and ordinary reason over the philosopher:
"But the most remarkable thing about ordinary reason in its practical concera is that it may have äs much hope äs any philosopher of hitting the mark. In fact, it is almost more certain to do so than the philosopher, because he has no principle which the common understanding lacks, while his judgement is easily confused by a mass of irrelevant considerations ... " (1785: 21/404 ).
The point is that the philosopher cannot pretend to have privileged access to a kind of wisdom that everyone eise lacks. Nevertheless a qualifiaction is necessary. Even common human reason is forced to call on the assistance of practical philosophy to escape from a paradox deeply embedded in human nature äs "a natural dialectic arises" (1785:21/405) between duty and our wishes and inclinations.
Textual evidenceis available(see Section III, p. 436 below) that Kant regarded the dialectical concept of the highest good äs the possession of the ordinary person's reason (l 790, II: 128-9/458). Indeed, in this case, saying that the ordinary person contradicts himself in confusion is not necessarily a reproach from which the philosopher escapes. In dealing with such an idea even the philosopher cannot help but do that (though he may also know the illusion is an artifact of the limits of his reason). Even the philosopher must advance from practical philosophy to what amounts to a doctrine of wisdom if he is to come to terms with the dialectic that results from an exposition of the idea of the highest good. Kant's definition of wisdom is worth citing now, though discussion of it must be postponed until Section III of this essay. "... Wisdom, theoretically regarded, means the knowledge of the highest good and, practically, the suitability of the will to the highest good ... " (1788: 135/130-1) ; there is a definite continuity between the last three paragraphs of Section I of the Foundations and the "Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason" (1788, Book II) äs Kant refers us to "natural dialectic " and "wisdom" in both passages, compare, 1788: 112/108 and 1785: 21-2/405; also see, 1790, II: 128/457; 133/462) .
In the next section of this essay two narrative documents will be presented that are prime candidates for being regarded äs products of the voice of humanity's untutored reason. Citing the stories of the fall from paradise äs told in the third chapter of Genesis and the Märchen (folk story) "the White Snake" will serve symbolically to present aspects of the rational idea of the highest good. Our treatment of them will help to answer the question of ho w we get access to the testimony of ordinary reason without falling prey either to the ordinary man's confusions or to the irrelevant considerations of the philosopher. To avoid the latter I must resist the temptation to narrate the episodes in question, which would become quite tedious. Accordingly, I must suppose the reader has access to the details of the texts in question. (In fact, the ideal way to proceed would be to read these stories now before continuing, and, then, to reread them once this analysis is completed.) Of course, both narratives are the precipitate of a long oral tradition with roots in pre-literate communities. Without engaging In a digression (available in some of the literature cited below) äs to historical antecedents, it suffices to say that these stories represent the condensation and residue of generations of human experience. The myth of the fall äs related in Genesis 3 was transcribed some millenia ago by the unknown editors of the Pentateuch; while our Märchen, which is also a narrative of the fall in its own way, was transcribed from its anonymous oral heritage under the editorial supervision of the brothers Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm (largely äs a by-product of their philological research) 2 . Taking this Step outside the explicit framework of Kant's practical philosophy is a radical move, but, I submit, a necessary one if we are to make sense of Kant's appeal to untutored reason.
However, before proceeding at least three misunderstandings of what follows must be canvassed. In all three cases the error serves to illuminate an aspect of what Kant's attitude might have been toward a use of narratives äs employed here, but misinterprets a conceivable and an autonomeus function of story-telling. No one can deny that many reasons are available for telling tales. These include entertainment, instruction, literary criticism, and others. Now Kant himself calls attention to the first of these in a section of the Third Critique on "The Empirical Interest in the Beautiful" (1790: Part I: 154/296). The fact that man is a social animal means he has tendencies to communicate his pleasures to others. Kant's examples include dressing-up in finery and the way primitive peoples adorn themselves, but invites extension to other more verbal forms of social interaction* Presumably, man also communicates his pleasures by being gregarious in conversation (including the after-dinner jokes and stories for which Kant was known). But Kant does not comment on whether an autonomous function of story-telling exists according to which narration would be an end in itself. Can we conceive of narration äs occasioning an cntirely disintercstcd plcasure and having thc form of purposiveness without purpose? It is a further issue that whcn thc narrativcs werc of anonymous composition over many gcncrations thcy would be beautiful Symbols that fit into neithcr of Kant's categories of beautlful nature or artworks äs thc product of thc intention of an individual man of genius 3 ,1 can cite no evidence that Kant scriously considered any of these possibilities, but also maintain that Kant's remarks on sociability in Scction 41 of the Third Critique do not cxhaust the matter. If necessary, I will dispute Kant's example that a man abandoned on a descrt island would nelther adorn his hut nor enjoy the beauty of flowers (1790,1:155/297), However, such a dispute may not beneededif Kant was merelynoting that such a man, being all alone in fact, would lose any empirical interest in the beautiful, but that his a priori faculty of taste would be unimpaired. Disinterested pleasures would be virtually the only ones available to such a person. Assuming that the monologue is capable of arousing such pleasures, although the empirical sociability of such a person would atrophy, his tendency to soliloquize might actually be augmented. This argument is meant to open up the hypothesis that story-telling can occasion that harmonious play of our cognitive faculties in which the experience of the beautiful is presented. I have tried to show that nothing that Kant says in Section 41 contradicts the possibility of narration functioning in this case. Furthermore, what follows cannot be taken äs supporting the application of principles of Kantian aesthetics to literary criticism. As attractive äs such a thesis might prima facia be for this essay, it is rejected in favor of the more controversial hypothesis that narration functions autonomously in humanity, perhaps in a way that complements metaphysics äs a natural disposition (1787: 56/B22). (That is, the tendency to symbolize might be aroused by the emergence of basic metaphysical questions about God, freedom, and immortality.) In any case, the possibility of a Kantian style of literary criticism (which would be a theoretic discipline) conflicts with Kant's explicit exclusion of an objective principle oftaste (1790,1:141/285; also see his remarks about the fate of critics and cooks in the same section).
Finally, just because the narratives arouse hope or humility in depicting virtue being rewarded or disobedience punished, that does not mean we are abstracting the idea of the highest good by a generalization from empirical examples (that the stories have definite marks according to which they are subsumable under a concept). In the case of the feel-3 Numerous problems emerge at this point. They deserve a more careful and sustained treatment than can be given in the Kmited space of one article. It is particularly important to realize that the symbolization of morality through beauty does not involve the evaluative use of a moral concept äs the determining ground of aesthetic approval. Further, if such a moral concept turns out to be an idea, then such a dialectical concept is apparently a part of any rational idea corresponding to the aesthetic idea through which the idea is presented in Symbols. Likewise, further work is needed to establish whether and in what sense Märchen are artworks, even though not the product of the genius of any one individual. I would like to refer the reader to two articles that serve to amplify the context of discussion and that may supply some of the basic terms for answering these questions. Kant-Studien, Jahrgang 68, Heft l, 1977. ings occasioned by the highest good the problem of deciding whether the affect precedes or coincides with the determining ground of the action (i. e., impure or pure motives) is no less, but also no more, serious than the case of respect for the moral law. Doubt is in principle always possible äs to whether our motive is identical with respect for duty, with the hope of promoting the highest good and humility at being unable to attain it through our own finite abilities. But we still have a rough-and-ready way of differentiating the moral worth of motives, which, äs Kant notes, even children are capable of perceiving:
"For the commonest observation shows that if we imagine an act of honesty performed with a steadfast soul and sundered from all view to any advantage in this or another world and even under the greatest temptations of need or allurement, it far surpasses and eclipses any similar action which was affected in the least by any foreign incentive; it elevates and arouses the wish to be able to act in this way. Even moderately young children feel this impression, and one should never represent duties to them in any other way " (1785: 27ftnt./411ftnt) 4 .
This note can profitably be extended to the condition under which a person has made himself worthy of attaining the highest good, nor should it be restricted to just children. Thus, saying that mere hope is all that remains to the virtuous after he has sacrificed his self-interest to duty is a distortion in which the prospect of satisfying one's desire is the source of the hope. The kind of hope which is occasioned by our duty to promote the highest good (and, indeed, may be represented äs identical with it) is the hope that man has the power to do his duty without suffering injustice. We do indeed come to recognize the presence of the highest good when we feel a hope of being able to further it and a certain humility at being unable to attain it. But diese feelings arise from the highest good without thereby being its cause.
Regarding the sequel äs an exercise in philosophical anthropology alone (though aspects of that may also be present) would reduce the inquiry to an empirical correlate of ethics (1785: 4/388), useful for purposes of instruction but without a priori content or implications. Alternatively, if a Kantian idiom for our method is required, it might be said that the rational concept of the highest good is being analytically extracted, disentangled, from the narrarives parallel to the way a table of categories can be unfolded from a table of judgements. The method is that of a modified "metaphysical deduction". A metaphysical deduction, unlike a transcendental one, does not have to demonstrate the a priori objective validity of the concept. Rather the enterprise is one of inquiry and discovery, not de jure demonstration. In Ught of Kant's division of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement into an exposition and a deduction (see, 1790,1:117/266) there is warrant for saying that a "metaphysical deduction" corresponds more to the former than the latter. Further, the method is a "modified" metaphysical exposition due to the fact that we are dealing, not with discursive judgements, but with a set of symbolic uses of language. We will have to take some pains to prune away a luxuriant growth of Symbols from our narratives in order to expose, embedded within them, the very same dialectical concept that Kant attributes to mankind's emergent sense of right and wrong. If successful, the inquiry will have exhibited the idea of the highest good äs being clearly an a priori one. This should retrospec-tively substantiate the choice of terms uscd to describe the method being applied in "exposing" the idea in the context of two narrative documents of untutored reason.
II
The next step is to gain a perspective on the main narrative elements that make our two tales differing variations on one and the same theme. Though we will argue in detail that such is the case, it is not at all obvious from the surface structure of the stories that they share a common subtext.
One of the best ways to show that they are alternative translations of the idea of the highest good into different sets of symbolic images and attributes is to lay out a context of parallels and correlations. In some cases, the correspondence between the two tales is direct. The contents of the tales are simple allusions to one another. Othertimes, the relation is more complex. The parallelism between the tales may display the kinds of reversals characteristic of images that are mirrorlike translations of one another. Reversals in the order of events or the consequences of actions occur. We will now see what this means in terms of the details of the narratives. In the following, the narrative of "the White Snake" is designated äs "Ni", that of Genesis 3, äs "N 2 ".
1. Both narratives display an initial contrast between ignorance and a certain kind of knowledge. The king in NI gains bis wisdom from eating something brought to him in a covered dish by his servant (the protagonist). Likewise, Adam and Eve, though not engaged in any active service, are ignorant of the distinction between good and evil unril they taste of the früh of the Tree of knowledge. Here "ignorance" is another name for "innocence". The two tales are clearly parallel in that their surface structures present their protagonists äs being in a state of innocence from which they are shortly displaced.
2. In both cases the transition from ignorance to moral understanding (wisdom) is facilitated or mediated by a serpent. The difference is that in N 2 the snake in question is active, while in NI he is passive. That is, the snake in the Garden of Eden talks (a form of activity). He offers Eve the fruit, telling her (what is in fact the case) that she will gain a measure of divinity if she eats it. In contrast, the snake in N! is the object, not the initiator, of the action. He is the one who is tasted by the king (and eventually by the servant). He is the forbidden fruit himself. The fact that the snake in NI is white is perhaps satan's punishment for having beguiled Eve . He is condemned to wear the color of innocence, a color calculated to be most hateful to him, äs an ironic sequel to the role he played in the Garden.
3. In N 2 Adam and Eve hide themselves after they have tasted the forbidden fruit. In NI however the servant first hides himself (locking himself in his room) and then tastes the forbidden fruit. This parallel involves a reversal of order in the events of the tales that seems to be independent of how one wishes to Interpret the meaning of "hiding" (say äs is traditionally done when referring to an awareness of nakedness or shame). The point is just to note the order of the sequence of events in N 2 is manipulated and transformed by NI. That there is order is essential; what the order is, is to a degree alterable.
4. Both tales contain an injunction against tasting. The violation of the injuncrion leads to certain complications involving obtaining a new kind of understanding and corresponding disadvantages. In N 2 the violation leads to the Situation of present-day humanity. Due to the disobedience of our mythical ancestors we do indeed have knowledge of good and evil. But we are also cursed with pain (the paradigm of which is childbirth), earning our bread by the sweat of our brows (work), and the inevitable uncertainty of the time of death. However, the servant's disobedience in N a confers on him a gift which is, even to us today, extra-human. He is able to understand the language of animals. This shift presents a reversal from above to below. How? A prima fade contrast between learning a "higher" and learning a "lower" language is presented by N 2 and respectively. Tasting the Tree of Knowledge teaches our ancestors the language of God. As the serpent says, they will "be äs gods knowing good and evil" (Genesis 3: 5; King James Version). But tasting the white snake teaches the servant the language of animals. He is able to understand birds, fish, and even ants-i. e., creatures of the air, sea, and land. The power co'nferred by the white snake is over-determined. But both violations, when taken äs literally laid out in the text, lead to the acquisition of a source of wisdom. However, one source is from "above", the other, from "below". Now along with the gift of moral understanding Adam and Eve gain something nega-J | tive äs well-the curses of pain, work, and death. Where is the corresponding curse in NI ?
Acutally only one of the curses is reflected in NI. But this, I submit, is enough to maintain the parallelism between the narratives. In short, no sooner does the servant in N! taste the "forbidden fruit" than something happens that results in his being condemned to death. He is accused of stealing the queen's favorite ring of gold, and he is enjoined to find the ring or be executed äs the thief. This raises a nice point. The servant is actually guilty of violating an injunction, but not the one of which he is in fact accused. He is f alsely accused of knowing who has the ring, but he is not accused of tasting the white snake. Of course, he is actually innocent in the first case and guilty in the second. He commits one crime, while he is simultaneously accused of another he does not commit. This reflects the paradoxical state of humanity, according to which we are held responsible for Adam's sin without having individually committed it. The individual is thrown into a world in which there is already evil. As a species man is represented äs bringing evil upon himself; but äs an individual he is neither innately evil nor innocent. Thus, the servant who tastes the white snake is the mythical ancestor, Adam, and the servant who does not steal the ring is his descendent upon whom the sin of the father is visited.
Still, the servant's initial transgrcssion turns out to be a felix cutpa, through which heis ablc to cscape thc pcnalty of dcath. Thanks to his new faculty of understanding, he overhcars a duck in the courtyard complaining that äs she was eating in haste she swallowed a ring that lay under the queen's window. The servant seizes the "culprit" and takes her to the cook. The missing ring is discovered, and the servant escapes from death.
Embedded in the pitiful end of the duck is the warning that remaining fixed and attached to one's inclinations (in this.case gluttony) is an animal mode of existence that can lead to the destruction of the seif. The duck suffers a fate quite appropriate to its level of existence. In accordance with the primitive morality of the lex talionis, all the duck does is eat, so it is, in turn, eaten. In this instance, understanding the language of animals suggests an acquaintance with the ways of instinctual greed. In Kantian terms, this is the basis of the tendency to reverse the order of maxims and make lower incentives supreme among maxims (1793: 38/46)» As Kant says, the rational origin of this tendency remains "inscruitable", but is re-enacted every time we make an exception in the moral law for ourselves.
5. Although the king offers the servant any position in the court he might desire äs recompense for the f alse accusation, the servant declines the generous offer. Instead, he asks for the means to undertake what amounts to a self-imposed exile 6 . The next part of NI consists in the servant's journeying into the world and exercising his moral judgement. In this sequence the gift of understanding the language of animals represents the ability to understand the demands that suffering, finite humanity makes on the servant's respect and love. Some work will be required to make sense of this sequence.
Thanks to his understanding of the language of animals the servant is able to hear the distress calls of the following animals: three fish caught in the reeds and suffocaring; a colony of ants being trampled by his horse; and three baby ravens, who have been evicted from their nest and are starving. In brief, the servant frees the fish from entanglement; he recognizes the ant's distress and turns his horse aside to let them pass; and he sacrifices his horse (killing it) to provide food for the ravens.
A first reading of NI seems to suggest the view that all life, including animal and insect life, is sacred or has moral worth. In a way, this recalls the Indian philosophy of life, Jainism. Wherever a Jaina ascetic goes, he sweeps the way before his feet with a little broom, so that no living thing will be crushed by his heel 7 . Transferring such a view to our Märchen would be bearable if only there were not two loose ends. The duck and the horse are included among living things, but they are slaughtered without hesitarion. Does the servant perhaps only understand the languages of fish, ants, and ravens, but not ducks and horses?
This objection is possible only if an important distinction, on which the Märchen plays, is ignored or overlooked. The duck and horse are domestic animals, which either live alongside man in a subordinate position or serve man's needs for transportation. The fish, ants, and ravens are wild animals, which either live distant and apart from man or actually compete with him (äs when ravens try to steal grain from a farmer). This binary Opposition between domestic and wild animals may seem stränge, but it is of the utmost import. Domestic animals form a part of human society, but do so in an asocial manner. They are Instruments subordinate to our ends. For the very reason that they are so close to us (äs agriculturalists), they are unsuitable images onto which to project our struggling and emerging humanity. Since they are treated äs Instruments everyday, our familiarity with them breeds a certain contempt.
On the one hand, when we want to insult someone, we are likely to compare them with domestic animals. Although I am not familiär with any examples directly relating to ducks or horses, other domestic fowl and beasts of bürden come to mind: "silly äs a goose", "lazy äs an ox", "stubborn äs a mule", "dumm ox". "Chicken" suggests the person is a coward, and "turkey"-which is a relatively recent addition-suggests someone is t a fool or sucker. Likewise, when we call someone a "bird brain" we are usually thinking of a pigeon or a duck, not an eagle or hawk. (I will leave it to the reader to collect reminders of how comparison with wild animals connotes respect or admiration.) On the other hand, wild animals can be permitted to represent aspects of our humanity that are worthy of respect for the very reason that the animals are so different and so physically separated from human society. Since they are so distant, they are a suitable attribute onto which to project aspects of humanity's finitude, not excluding our most limitingand perhaps most humbling -weaknesses. But, although these weaknesses may be humbling, it is not considered an insult to call attention to them.
It is not that the horse and duck are regarded äs belonging to the same category äs the fish, ants, and ravens and that the latter are arbitrarily deemed to be more valuable and worthy of respect. Rather the horse and the ravens belong to distinct categories -domestic versus wild -to which the difference between instrumental and human attributes has been assimilated. Therefore, the sequence in NI that depicts the servant coming to the rescue of the fish, etc. need not be understood äs an instance of his respect for the moral worth of all living things (for not all living things have moral worth). Instead, what the servant recognizes in these creatures are aspects of his own finite humanity.
These wild animals are not to be taken literally äs animals, but rather äs symbols for something eise which cannot be directly presented. The fish, ants, and ravens set up an echo with the origin of the most pervasive consequences of the fall in N 2 : birth, work, and death. It is important not to get carried away and assign more to this Interpretation than is really there. Basically, an alternative is being presented to the thesis that asserts that N! advances the view that all lif e has moral worth. The alternative is that the fish present humanity's finitude in the face of birth. It is no accident that the fish in NI are suffocating. The new-born child's first task is to take a breath of air and fill his lungs with life-giving oxygen. Asphixiation is the first terror faced by the neonate. Likewise, the colony of ants presents the image of the anonymoüs crowd, whose individuality is lost in lives of silent struggle. Further, the ants are proverbial hard workers. Like the ants, hu-mamty must carn its livelihood by the sweat of the brow. The industry of the ants äs well äs their lack of individuality expresses the ordinary man's Situation In the time between birth and dcath. He must labor in Order to harvest. Finally, the ravens are well-suited to play the role of funeral bird due to the fact that they wear the color of mourning. They also feed on the flesh of the dead horse. This is humanit/s fate when the avaiiable time is spent -to become carrion. So the image of the ravens communicates mankind's finitude before death.
Kant may actuaJJy be able to provide us with a technical term for the function of these animal images. In Section 49 of the Critique ofAestheticJudgement he cites the function of "aesthetic attributes" (l790,1:177/315) in providing an indirect presentation for ideas of reason that cannot otherwise be adequately exhibited in Intuition. (Kanr/s examples include the eagle and peacock äs emblems of the king and queen of heaven -Jupiter and Juno -respectively.) If the important qualification is added that the Märchen is not concerned with giving empirical examples of birth, work, etc. -which in no way form a part of the surface structure of the story anyway -but rather with the "rational origin" of these aspects of humanity, then their resistance to formulation in determinate concepts or examples subsumed under them should be no surprise. The attributes "fish", "ants", and "ravens" are meant to provoke more reflection than could be occasioned by the Substitution of empirical examples of particular persons in need of help. In virtue of these limits of pain, work, and death human beings have need of one another's cooperation and collaboration if we are to further the highest good. Although we share these "curses" with many animal species, only we humans are capable of showing that they are not meaningless evils. Although these limits make us "human all-too-human", they also off er opportunities for promoting our self-perfection in furthering the weif are of others. So in spite of a luxuriant growth of aesthetic attributes here, the point is the servant's recognition of the impossibility of consistently willing a phenomenal nature in which absolutely independent beings would refuse to help one another 8 . This recognition, in turn, forms the supreme condition of the servant's own worthiness to be happy, the addition of the latter forming the highest good qua bonum consummatum (1788: 114/110). This leads to the sixth interconnection between the two narratives and to the role of the highest good.
6. Now the relation between the two narratives (which, I am arguing, are intricately interrelated) and the dialectical concept of the highest good can best be captured in Kantian terms äs the relation between an aesthetic and a rational idea. The former is mobilized to present symbolically an idea of reason that is otherwise incapable of being adequately given in either an empirical Intuition or a priori Schema (in the technical sense) 9 . In general, N 2 presents the highest good äs an instance of disobedience punished. The curses inflicted upon Adam and Eve cannot be reversed, though under a Christian in-8 A complete discuseion of Kant's views on the possibility of conceiving and the impossibility of willing a world without active benificence cannot be furnished here. A contradiction arises in the latter case from my wanting help from others to promote my happiness but my not being willing to help them to further their own happiness. 9 I realize that my Interpretation of aesthetic ideas äs myths is controversial. That some of the terms Levi-Strauss applies to myths (in his "Structural Study of Myth") are similar to those used by Kant terpretation of the Old Testament they are able to be redeemed. In NI the servant is given a chance to redeem his initial disobedience (and to become the master of his new source of moral understanding) by undertaking what amounts to an educational apprenticeship in ethical judgement. His exile from his homeland (which unlike the exile from the Garden in N 2 is self-imposed) actually leads to his subsequent virtue being rewarded. This transpires in the climactic sequence of the Märchen in which the servant receives help (without asking for it and äs if by "coincidence") from those he had rescued. But before proceeding a preliminary casuistical question arises. Does the servant's rescue of the fish, ants, and ravens show that he is a man of good will or does it rather merely show that he is prüdem? If his motive for lending assistance is the thought that he may someday need the help of others in order to promote his own welfare, then the moral worth of his motive is doubtful. Now although one can never be certain that a person is acting solely from a good will -for that would require that his action have no material consequences, which can never be the case in the phenomenal world -we are not completely adrift when faced with questions of motivation. As many of Kant's paradigms indicate (e. g., 1785:13-5/397-99), in volitionfrom duty the remmciation of self-interest is the specific mark of the will's being determined by respect for the moral law. While a skeptic may perhaps raise doubts in principle whether the servant has a good will, the way in which he sacrifices his own self-interest in helping the hungry (killing his horse for f ood and going forward on foot) is suggestive of his action being based on the spirit and not only the letter of the law. Furthermore, the f act that we are dependent on the cooperation of our fellows in attempting to further our own individual happiness tends to become irrelevant when the issue is not merely promoting one's happiness but actually attaining it
10
. This is where a Märchen''s symbolic presentation has an advantage over any empirical examples of alleged virtue that might be collected. In order to attain what amounts to perfect happiness (an admittedly undefinable concept) the servant must confront three tasks which we cannot even imagine his accomplishing through the exercise of his finite, human capacities. He succeeds only through his participation in a faculty of reason surpassing every finite Standard of sensibility. That is, even the complete cooperation of his fellow humans is insufficient for his attaining success. The reader of the Märchen is required to go beyond the context of interdependent humanity and posit an underlying moral order of the universe in order to render the outcome at all conceivable. Within this casuistical framework, the Märchen''s depiction of the servant's succeeding in attaining his treasured reward implies that he is a man of good will.
To win the hand of the princess in marriage and a share of the royal kingdom, the servant must do the following: retrieve a small golden ring thrown into the vastness of the in defining aesthetic ideas is suggestive. Both are committed to the "inexhaustibility" of the symbolic images in question through the use of conceptual language. Although he does not discuss myths, the details of a more complete account of the process of symbolizadon, including relevant quotations, are available in John Silbers article, Der Schematismus der Praktischen Vernunft, Kant-Studien, Jahrgang 56, Heft 3-4, 1966. 10 We are dependent on the cooperation of our equals to further a kingdom of ends, but we are dependent on the moral author of the world to attain the highest good.
sca; collect tcn sacks of tiny millet seeds by band in the darkness of only one night (and not onc sccd can be missing); and fetch an apple from the Tree of Life. If he fails in either of the first two tasks, he must die immediately. The third task entails a sentence of wandering around the world until he either succeeds, gives up hope, or perishes. The stakes are indeed high. For a lowly servant, the band of the princess and a part of the kingdom are truly "the treasure hard-to-attain". In addition to attaining happiness in a close relation with the beautiful princess, the servant is challenged to attain a condition in which he is the ruler instead of the ruled. No reader of Märchen believes he can become ruler over any kingdom other than the realm of bis own existence. I do not think lengthy argument is needed that the goal sought in this case is to become a seif-ruler, an autonomous person. The narrative presents this two-fold treasure-autonomy and happiness in proportion to moral worth -äs being accessible to the man of good will (though not through the exercise of any of bis own finite abilities).
Without repeating all the details, it suffices to mention that in all three tasks the servant is assisted by the same fish, ants, and ravens whom he had rescued. (It is also important to note that the story contains no mention of the servant's in any way either asking or expecting to be helped by them in spite of bis ability to communicate with animals.)
Another casuistical question worth considering is whether the timely arrival of the fish and ants is random chance and coincidence or whether their coming points towards the moral author of the universe. Naturally, their assistance would have been impossible if the servant had not initially rescued them, but their arrival is not strictly caused by bis exercise of good will on their behalf. In order to account for the sufficiently determined character of the success -the f act that his moral worth is brought into harmony with bis self-interest -one is invited to postulate the influence of a moral author of the universe acting on his behalf. This' 'invitation" is repeated three times -one coincidence is perhaps imaginable, but three in a row begins to form a pattern. Although the servant is more of a doer than a thinker, Hamlet's words apply to him: "Our indiscretion sometime serves us well/When our deep plots do pall, and that should learn us/There's a divinity that shapes our ends,/Rough-hew them how we will-" (V, ii: 8-11). The arrivals of the fish and ants in the nick-of-time are not empirical examples of morality, but are meant to evoke symbolically the idea that there is, äs Hamlet says, a "divinity that shapes our ends", whose influence is needed if rewards are to be fairly distributed in relation to moral worth. The third task faced by the servant, though equally "impossible", is somewhat different from the other two. The princess assigns the servant the task of fetching an apple from the Tree of Life. The ravens fly to the end of the world and get the apple for him. When the couple share this treasure, the princess, who had previously been proud, is filled with love for the hero. So the scale is balanced for a third time. The servant is the recipient of an unanticipated but appropriate reward that harmonizes with his earlier display of moral worth.
What is the significance that the servant and the princess in NI actually succeed in doing something that is denied to Adam and Eve in N 2 -i.e., eating of the Tree of Life? Recall how, according t o the text of N 2 , the couple are expelled from the Garden to prevent them from eating of this Tree, which has the property of conferring immortality on the one who tastes of it 11 . This is virtually the only point where an item from the verbatim account of Genesis 3 appears in the surface text of the Märchen (excluding the white snake itself, which is a very well-disguised Garden-serpent). A literal reading of the Märchen indicates that the kind of immortality attained by the couple is that provided by falling in love, having a family, and (presumably) producing offspring. But a deeper level of significance is also sounded by the property possessed by the Tree of Life in Genesis 3, namely, the power of conferring an unlimited and divine sort of immortality. We should not forget that this Märchen is a secularization of a basically Christian reading of the myth of the fall. Thus, it should not be surprising that the tale ends by making an allusion to the hope for eternal life which is fundamental to the Christian faith. If this is plausible, then we find that both of the postulates that Kant finds necessary for an intelligible exposition of the idea of the highest good are symbolically presented in (1788: 126-39/121-35). In order to make sense of the possibility of the servant being rescued by the fish and ants one must posit the existence of a moral author who is orchestrating the servant's timely reward. Now we find an allusion to the first postulate of practicai reason embedded in the third rescue by the ravens. The appearance of the Tree of Life is the attribute which symbolically presents the postulate of immortality. Before turning in Section III to further philosophical issues, one concluding remark is in order.
The symbol of the white snake was characterized above (see, p. 429) äs ahighly over-determined one. One such determination was actually given -that it represents a source of understanding of the instincts and inclinations (a "lower" language of sensibility). Two further determinations -corresponding, in Kantian terms, to the faculties of judgment and reason -also deserve to be mentioned. The power conferred by tasting the white snake involves a capacity to make moral judgements. The servant exercises this faculty of judgement in the sequence in which he is faced with the appeals for help from the wild animals. Like the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25 ff.), this episode is not only about the need for charity, but also about the definition of what makes a human community. (It is also worth nothing that the context of this parable is what one must do to inherit eternal life.) After saying one's duty is to "love God totally, and thy neighbor äs thy seif", a lawyer asks Jesus, "Who is my neighbor?" Jesus answers, in effect, that neighbors are members of the same Community (which may embrace the whole of humanity). Both a priest and a Levite ignore the plight of a fellow citizen from Jerusalem, who has been robbed and assaulted. In contrast, a Samaritan stops to help the man. Jesus* concluding question receives a response in every heart: "Who then of these three, thinkest thou, was 11 See, Genesis 3:22-3: "And the Lord God said, Behold the man is become äs one of us, to know good and evil: and now, lest he put forth bis hand, and take also of the Tree of Life, and eat, and live forever:/"Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of Eden ..." Thus, man's exile was intended to prevent a further transgression, not to punish him. Presumably, man's failure to taste this second früh explains (in the manner of a "just-so story") his intermediate Status berween animals and divinity. He would have escaped and, so to speak, "reversed" the curse attached to tbe Tree of Knowledge if could have tasted of the Tree of Life.
30 Kant-Studien 69 neighbor unto him that feil among the thieves?" Like the Samaritan, the servant recognized himself in the person in need. He judged that his self-respect would suffer if he passed-by without lending a hand. And like the figure of Jesus, the servant becomes the personification, the archetype, of one who is morally well-pleasing to God -an idea, which, äs Kant says, "is already present in our reason" (1793: 56/77). Finally, tasting the white snake infuses the servant with "a faculty of mind surpassing every Standard of sense" (1790,1:98/250). It is indeed the sequence in which the servant must retrieve the ring, collect the millet, and find the Tree of Life that does the most violence the reader's Imagination. We cannot conceive of his succeeding through the exercise of any of his finite faculties. If any sublime moments are embedded in this Märchen, then they are the servant's confrontations with the depths of the sea, the veritable infinity of tiny millet seeds, and the vast, humanly untraversable distance to the Tree of Life. AIthough nature is great and mighty, it does not have dominion over man thanks to his susceptibility to moral ideas. Still, "reason exercises a dominion over sensibility with a view to extending it to the requirements of its own realm (the practical) and letting it look out beyond itself into the infinite which for it is an abyss" (1790, I: 115/265: translation slightly modified). Even the most terrible aspects of nature are inadequate äs a Schema for man's supersensible, moral ideas. From the standpoint of sensibility, the Imagination is exhausted in attempting to accomplish an infinite task in a limited context of space and time; but from the perspective of reason, man's awareness of moral ideas lends him hope of overcoming the limits of his self-understanding 12 . The Symbols of N! and N 2 become a source of moral reflection äs they give rise to an awareness of the highest good. Though ordinary reason may leave us untutored at times, we are still capable of being richly instructed by a sensitive sounding of its symbolic complexities.
III
Now two previous promises must be fulfilled, and some loose ends pulled together. This will lead back into the details of Kant-interpretation. I must discharge my Obligation to discuss the textual evidence that Kant regarded the highest good äs an idea germane to ordinary reason. I must also discuss what kind of an argument Kant is making in turning to the testimony of the latter. But äs the second promise was to be fulfilled only enpassant the scope of the question will be narrowed to what kind of an argument is Kam's formulation of themoral proof of the existence of God (1790, II: 114ff./447ff.). The latter is no mean task, and it must include a discussion of whether and in what sense this proof is an artifact of ordinary, untutored reason. Discharging the first promise, which is relatively straight-forward, will lead naturally to the second issue. Some connections with Section II will also be elaborated.
Two main texts are available -one supportive, the other contentious -in which Kant comments on whether the highest good is "universally comprehensible to the most untutored reason" 13 . In the first text, the "lurking notion, however obscure" ("dunkle Vorstellung 9 ') to which Kant refers is evidently the ordinary person's apprehension of the summum bonum:
"The moment mankind began to reflect upon right and wrong ... one inevitable judgement must have forced itself upon them. It could never be that the,issue is all alike, whether a man has acted fairly or falsely, with equity or with violence, though up to his life's end, äs far at least äs human eye can see, his virtues have brought him no reward, his transgressions no punishment. It seems äs though they perceived a voice within them say it must make a difference. So there must have been a lurking notion, however obscure, of something after which they feit themselves bound to strive ..." (1790, II: 128-9/458).
Although the human eye witnesses frequent counter-examples to the highest good, "a voice within" flies in the face of experience. Now what is important for this essay is whether the very same voice responsible for hesitantly saying "it must make a difference" is also responsible, in its more articulate moments through the ages, for presenting that "dark representation" of the summum bonum in the symbolic matrix dissected in Section II. Engaging this question requires elucidating Kant's figure of Speech (for I take the "voice within" to be a Symbol for moral reflection) even further. Could it be that this is the voice to which the servant's ears are opened when he tastes the white snake? That our two narrarives can, upon examination, turn our to have a Kantian account of the highest good äs their logical infra-structure (their "deep structure" to invoke an admittedly nonKanrian term) suggests an affirmative response.
While the above is very supportive of our exposition of the highest good äs a possession of untutored reason, Kant also provides another, more recalcitrant text for discussion.
The following text is a problematic one for our thesis, for it may seem to contradict the view that the ordinary man is at all justified in hoping to promote, much less attain, the highest good. Kant writes the following about a virtuous person: "Deceit, violence, and envy will always be rife around him, although he himself is honest, peaceable, and benevolent; and the other righteous men [Rechtschaffenen] that he meets in the world, no matter how deserving they may be of happiness, will be subjected by nature, which takes no heed of such deserts, to all the evils of want, disease, and untimely death, just äs are the other animals on the earth. And so it will continue to be until one wide grave engulfs them all-just and unjust, there is no distinction in the grave -and hurls them back into the abyss of the aimless chaos of matter from which they were taken -they that were able to believe themselves the final end of creation" (l 790, II: 121/452).
This text is certainly consistent with the view that the attainment of the highest good is not consthutive of morality. Howcver, unless the passage is put in context it may prove to be misleading, supporting the vicw that the highest good is not even regulative of morality. In this passage Kant was in fact engaging in a reductio ad absurdum of a certain caricature of pantheism. He was explicitly referring to a man who, like Spinoza (under Kam's Interpretation of him), did not believe in God but was still "righteous". Such an individual is overwhelmed with despair in contemplating the evils of life. The total denial of hope makes this text uncharacteristic of Kant's thought. It may be that what Kant is doing is giving a description of the affective fate of the fool who denies there is a God. His fate is a melancholy reminder, more reminiscent of the condition of Adam (or perhaps Job) than of the servant, that life is no fairy tale. Virtues often bring no reward and transgressions no punishment.
This brings us to the crux of the problem of what kind of an argument Kant needs to furnish to Supplement the ordinary man's conflicting hunches ("intuitions" in the nontechnical sense) about the highest good. The fact that we feel so constrained to promote the highest good (the voice of reason asserts "it must make a difference") in spite of its being so monumentally difficult to attain leaves us dangling precariously above that abyss of the "aimless" ("zwecklosen") chaos of matter. While it would certainly be more convenient to avoid the whole issue of the relation between the highest good and the postulates of practical reason (inparticular the second one), even the most primitive reflection on the former leads in the direction of the nature of a moral proof of the existence of God. Warrant for asserting the latter is the case is at band in the following remark: "This moral proof is not in any sense a newly discovered argument, but at the most only an old one in a new form. For its earliest germ was lying in the mind of man when bis reason first quickened into life, and it only grew and ever developed with the progressive culture of that faculty." (1790, : 128/458 ; the text continues äs the quote from 1790, II: 128-9/458 cited above.) Kant's remark is almost perfectly parallel to the rhetorical question cited on p. 423 (i!, e., 1788: 8ftnt./8ftnt.) about Kant's "new" principle of morality. Thus, the answer to-the question whether Kant's argument is available to untutored reason is a qualified "yes". It is available äs an obscure representation of the highest good, for that is what the expression "earliest germ" proceeds to encompass. The highest good is the logical seed, the germ, from which the postulates of practical reason grow and develop.
Of the two texts in question ("The moment mankind ..." and "Deceit, violence, and envy ...") it seems to me that any tension between them is no more absolute than the distinction between our Märchen (N a ) and Genesis 3 (N 2 ), respectively. This is especially apparent if one focuses on their overall affective tone. That is, the message of the first tends to be optimistic, inspiring hope; while the second plays on a certain despair that there is evil in the world, to which we must reconcile ourselves. So like our narratives, the texts from Kant highlight two aspects of one and the same dialectical concept. Although both these texts äs well äs our narratives are reflections on the highest good, which, in turn, directs us to the postulates of practical reason, at this late point I do not propose to enter into a digression on the "ought implies can" thesis, which usually accompanies scholarly treatment of the postulates. My contribution will have a different and, I hope, original f ocus, which outflanks this thesis, which, in any case, has received exhaustive and superior treatment in the literature 14 . Kant's best shot at a concise representation of the relation between the highest good and the postulates of practical reason seems to go beyond the scope of arguments available to untutored reason (including the "ought implies can" thesis). In another context, entirely unrelated to any explicit remarks about the highest good, Kant assets that the relation between freedom and the moral law has the following form: "... When I say that freedom is the condition of the moral law and later assert that the moral law is the only condition under which freedom can be known, I will only remind the reader that, although freedom is certainly the ratio essendi of the moral law, the latter is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom. For had not the law already been distinctly thought in our reason, we would never have been justified in assuming anything like freedom, even though it is not self-contradictory. But if there were no freedom, the moral law would never have been encountered in us" (1788: 4ft./4ftnt.).
As far äs I know, Kant nowhere even suggests that the terms of this relation can be applied elsewhere. However, the hypothesis that such a relation also obtains in the case of the highest good and the postulates of practical reason is definitely worth exploring. Reflection on the idea of the highest good leads to an antinomy from which reason can extract itself by conceiving of the possibility that a person's own self-perfection and happiness in harmony with moral worth can be fully attained only through the supposition of a horizon of infinite progress (immortality) and a moral author of the world capable of redressing life's frequent injustices. The endeavor to think consistently about and reconcile the terms of the highest good leads to the recognition of the postulates of practical reason. We become aware of these postulates in reflecting on the highest good. Thus, the highest good is the ratio cognoscendi of the existence of God and the immortal soul. This does not imply that the highest good is causally efficacious in producing these postulates. The order of our cognition does indeed reflect the order of being, but proceeds in the opposite direction. The postulates of God and the immortal soul are, in their turn, the ratio essendi of the highest good. If no God exists, then neither does the highest good exist; and, if immortality is unavailable to us, self-perfection (das oberste Gut) is also an illusion. This reciprocal relation between the postulates and the highest good lends the argument 14 Further bibliographical data can be found in John Silbers Kant's Conception of the Highest Good äs Immanent and Transcendent, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 68, No.4, Oct. 1959 . This article also contains a useful treatment of the issue of whether and in what sense the highest good is a duty. Silber cites the text about Spinoza äs evidence that Kant held the highest good to be impossible of complete attainment for a finite creature. I do not see any reason to disagree with his conclusion (and I rely on it in this essay) that the attainment of the highest good is regulative of morality, while the funhering or promotion of the highest good is constitutive. Silber* s article has my use of the ratio essendi-cognoscendi distinction within reach, but he neither explicitly nor suggestively applies its terms to the summum bonum. Personally, I have some doubts (which are not central to the argument of my paper) that it is not the case that the highest good like freedom "is an exception to the rule that ideas of pure reason cannot be embodied or have objects äs actual matters of fact" (ibid., p. 470). Also see, Silber, The fmportance ofthe Highest Good in Kant's Etbics, Ethics, Vol. 73, No.3, April 1963, pp. 179-97, especially p. 183. · ' thc appearance of one pulling itself up by its own boot Straps. That is why-restricting the discussion to the second postulate -Kant admits how limited is the force of his proof:
"This moral argumcnt is not intcnded to supply an objectively valid proof of the existence of God. It is not mcant to dcmonstratc to the skeptic that there is a God, but that he must adopt the assumption of this proposition s a maxim of practical reason, if he wishes to think in a manner consistent with morality" (1790, II: 119ftnt./450ftnt.).
• With this qualification in mind -that the issue is evidently not one of an objective argument adequate for theoretic knowledge -the obvious question is, "What kind of knowledge or cognition is entailed by this argument?" Kant has no less than three answers to this question, which will now be discussed in an approximate order of their increasing importance. First, in treating the type of assurance provided by a proof of God, he distinguishes proofs κατ* άλήθειαν from ones κατ' άνϋρωπον(1790), II: 134/463). He exhaustively canvasses the four types of "alethic" proofs in so far s they support theoretic conviction, dismissing them in turn. He does not comment further on an anthroponic proof in this passage except to say that he is "taking the latter word in the broad sense of man in the abstract". Whatever Kant is trying to capture by this distinction, he makes it clear that an "anthroponic proof" is different than "anthropomorphism". The latter is an invalid type of theoretic argument, in which no ground is available in intuition for transferring the marks of a concept between terms of an analogy ( s when we attribute human understanding or volition to God). Kant does not say anything that might be taken s elucidating the nature or use of anthroponic proofs until the next section (91). Even then the term is not explicitly mentioned again, and one must read between the lines.
Kant begins section 91 (1790, II: 140/467) by referring to what can be an object of knowledge "for us". He furnishes a further clue s to what is meant by providing a proof anthroponically by referring to "the subjective nature of our powers of representation" (1790, II: 140/467; third line). Presumably such a proof is limited in application to human beings and would not be valid for all rational creatures if their faculties of representation did not include those of desire and sensibility. Kant further suggests that such a proof informs one about the self-involvement of our concepts with their corresponding faculties of cognition, but not about the comparison between the concepts and their objects. One major result of such self-involvement of concepts with their corresponding facultative capacities is a growth in the complexity of ,the content of knowledge. Indeed, one might accuse Kant of playing fast and loose with the meaning of "knowledge" when -in the same passage -he says that "things knowable" ("Erkennbare Dinge'
3 ) include "matters of faith" (ibid, line 12). But that he does so is s undeniable s it is problematic. Still, the b rden of this usage must be shouldered if the highest good is to make sense s the ratio cognoscendi of the existence of God.
This leads to Kant's third answer, which may initially complicate things further, but is ultimately his most satisfying solution to what kind of knowledge is contained in recognizing god through the summum bonum. Kant's twofold definition of wisdom s "knowledge of the highest good" and "the suitability of the will to the highest good" was cited on p. 424 of this essay. Kant distinguishes both theoretic and practical aspects in jthis text (1788:135/130-1). Yet, later on he remarks that "all our knowledge of God is merely symbolic" (1790,1:223/353); and the only correspondingperceptible content is a feeling of "confidence" (1790, II: 146/472). However, Kam makes clear that he is speaking informally and relating his own thought to a way of life and a tradition that cannot be adequately captured without more grandiose claims than a modest man would make. Kant advances a System of knowledge devoted to the furthering of the highest good, before which scholarship is humbled. Perhaps because it is such a long text, the following passage has been neglected: "To define this idea [of the sumum bonum] practically, i. e., sufficiently for the maxims of our rational conduct, is the task of the doctrine of wisdom, which, äs a science, is philosophy in the sense in which the ancients understood the word, for whom it meant instruction in the concept wherein the highest good was to be placed and in the conduct by which it was to be obtained. It would be well if we left tbis word witb its old meaning y äs a doctrine ofthe highest good sofaras reason stnves to bring it to the level of science» For, on the one hand, the qualifying condition would be suitable to the Greek expression (which means love of wisdom), andyet entirely adequate to comprehend under the name of philosophy the love of science ... For to be a teacher of wisdom would mean something more than to be a scholar who has not yet progressed far enough to conduct himself, and even less anyone eise, to so high an end; it would mean to be a master ofthe knowledge of wisdom, which says more than a modest man would presume to claim. Philosophy äs well äs wisdom itself would always remarn an ideal, which objectively is represented completely only in reason and which subjectively is only the goal for the person's unceasing endeavors" (1788: 112-3/108-9; first italics by L.A.).
Two "details, relevant to this essay, should be emphasized. First, when untutored reason is developed, unfolded, tenderly cultivated, the result is a System of wisdom, not scholarship. The apprenticeship for the former is life experience, and, accordingly, the ordinary man (if such an ideal type is regarded äs admissible) has äs much chance of hitting the mark äs the academic expert. Second, the "knowledge" that is transmitted in presenting the highest good äs the ratio cognoscendi of the existence of God corresponds to this broad use of "doctrine of wisdom". As such, no a priori reason exists for excluding theoretic results in so far äs they can be adapted to furthering the highest good. (That is the Service theory performs when it allows men to master disease and forecast the approach of hurricanes or other natural catastrophes. The question of whether these evils are necessary or contingent seems to be no more answerable than why space and time are the only a priori forms of Intuition in man.) Yet, it is clear that the theoretic-practical dichotomy is inadequate to articulate the many symbolic components of such a way of conducring philosophy. Thus, when Kant remarks that "all our knowledge of God is merely symbolic" he is referring to a form of presentation of such a System of wisdom, to which story-telling äs a symbolic use of language would belong. In conclusion take a moment to recall that the exposition of myth and Märchen äs presented by this essay forms a contribution to scholarship. Then consider how the telling of stories äs by Protagoras to Socrates or by Goethe's mother to her son constitutes a way of practicing philosophy 15 .
The path led him into a wood, and there he saw two old ravens Standing by their nest, and throwing out their young ones. "Out with you, you idle, good-for-nothing creatures!" cried they; "we cannot find food for you any longer; you are big enough, and can provide for yourselves." But the poor young ravens lay upon the ground, flapping their wings, and crying: "Oh, what helpless chicks we are! We must shift for ourselves, and yet we cannot fly! What can we do, but lie here and starve?" So the good young fellow alighted and killed his horse with his sword, and gave it to them for food. Then they came hopping up to it, satisfied their hunger, and cried: "We will remember you -one good turn deserves another!"
And now he had to use his own legs, and when he had walked a long way, he came to a large city. There was a great noise and crowd in the streets, and a man rode up on horseback, crying aloud: "The King's daughter wants a husband; but whoever seeks her hand must perform a hard task, and if he does not succeed he will forfeit his life." Many had already made the attempt, but in vain; nevertheless when the youth saw the King's daughter he was so overcome by her great beauty that he forgot all danger, went before the King, and declared himself a suitor.
So he was led out to the sea, and a gold ring was thrown into it, before his eyes; then the King ordered him to fetch this ring up from the bottom of the sea, and added: "If you come up again without it you will be thrown in again and again until you perish amid the waves." All the people grieved for the handsome youth; then they went away, leaving him alone by the sea.
He stood on the shore and considered what he should do, when suddenly he saw three fishes come swimming towards him, and they were the very fishes whose lives he had saved. The one in the middle held a mussei in its mouth, which it laid on the shore at the youth's feet, and when he had taken it up and opened it, there lay the gold ring in the shell. Füll of joy he took it to the King, and expected that he would grant him the promised reward.
But when the proud princess perceived that he was not her equal in birth, she scorned him, and required him first to perform another task. She went down into the garden and strewed with her own hands ten sacks-full of millet-seed on the grass; then the said: "Tomorrow morning before sunrise these must be picked up, and not a single grain be wanting."
The youth sät down in the garden and considered how it might be possible to perform this task, but he could think of nothing, and there he sät sorrowfully awaiting the break of day, when he should be led to death. But äs soon äs the first rays of the sun shone into the garden he saw all the ten sacks Standing side by side, quite füll, and not a single grain was missing. The ant-king had come in the night with thousands and thousands of ants, and the grateful creatures had by great industry picked up all the millet-seed and gathered them into the sacks.
Presendy the King's daughter herseif came down into the garden, and was amazed to see that the young man had done the task she had given him. But she could not yet conquer her proud heart, and said:" Although he has performed both the tasks, he shall not be my husband until he has brought me an apple from the Tree of Life." The youth did not know where the Tree of Life stood, but he set out, and would have gone on for ever, äs long äs his legs would carry him, though he had no hope of finding it. After he had wandered through three kingdoms, he came one evening to a wood, and lay down under a tree to sleep. But he heard a rustling in the branches, and a golden apple feil into his hand. At the same time three ravens flew down to him, perched themselves upon his knee, and said: "We are the three young ravens whom you saved from starving; when we had grown big, and heard that you were seeking the Golden Apple, we flew over the sea to the end of the world, where the Tree of Life Stands, and have brought you the apple/' The youth, füll of joy, set out homewards, and took the Golden Apple to the King's beautiful daughter, who had now no more excuses left to make. They cut the Apple of Life in two and ate it together; and then her heart became füll of love for him, and they lived in undisturbed happiness to a great age.
